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Poder e seleção de termos contratuais: o caso do 
setor de suco de laranja brasileiro
O objetivo é propor um modelo para explicar como os termos 
contratuais são selecionados na presença de poder: poder de 
contrato. O setor de suco de laranja ilustra a análise, indicando 
os efeitos do poder de contrato na organização econômica do 
setor. Poder de contrato é definido como a capacidade de explorar 
lacunas ou falhas contratuais, que são deixadas incompletas 
estrategicamente. Evidências empíricas a partir da análise de 
conteúdo de documentos de defesa da concorrência suportam a 
lógica do poder de contrato de três formas: evitando a mudança no 
método de pagamento de peso para conteúdo de sólido (qualidade); 
utilizando informações assimétricas para manipular índices na 
fórmula de cálculo do preço da laranja; e atrasando deliberadamente 
a colheita da laranja e, consequentemente, reduzindo seu peso 
e preço. O artigo contribui para o entendimento da seleção dos 
termos do contrato, bem como as formas de atuação de escritórios 
de defesa da concorrência sobre este tópico.
Palavras-chave: contrato, poder, custos de mensuração, agribusiness.
1. INTRODUCTION
During the 1990s, citrus growers accused juice processor industries of 
using contract terms as a vehicle for economic power in order to raise profits, 
which started litigation in the Brazilian antitrust office. In reality, markets and 
contracts are imperfect. Frequently, economists assume that contract terms are 
competitively selected in order to maximize the expected value of cooperation, 
neglecting issues of bargaining or surplus division (Barzel, 1997, Allen & 
Lueck, 2002). In this competitive perspective, agents are only some kind of 
contract term “takers” because they cannot influence the process of terms 
selection. In this paper, we address situations in which competition is not a 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license.
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sufficient mechanism to coordinate the process of contract 
terms selection. When competition fails, contract failures take 
place and economic power can influence the choice of terms. 
The research question is: how does power affect the selection 
of contract provisions in the orange juice sector?
Under traditional analysis (Williamson, 1979, Grossman & 
Hart, 1986, Hart & Moore, 1990, Barzel, 1997), contractual 
problems arise because of some kind of incompleteness due 
to bounded rationality, measurement difficulties, information 
asymmetries and the presence of opportunism. Although 
recognizing contractual incompleteness, this study investigates 
the influence of power in the selection process of contract terms. 
In other words, contracts present both incompleteness and 
failures. Contractual failures, as with market failures, enable 
agents to influence term selection through contract power. We 
define contract power as the ability to exploit contractual gaps 
or failures of contractual provisions, which are strategically 
left incomplete. 
The theoretical model exploits the ability of an economic 
agent to impose measurement costs over a commodity’s 
attributes, grounded in the Economic Analysis of Property 
Rights (Barzel, 1997). Following Barzel (2002: 18), power is 
the ability to impose costs. If higher measurement costs unveil 
fewer attributes of a commodity, as imposition of measurement 
costs become higher, fewer attributes will be specified in the 
transaction. In a contractual perspective, selection of contract 
terms that impose higher measurement costs leaves deliberate 
contractual gaps or unspecified attributes. These unspecified 
attributes could be consumed with no marginal payment, 
because no legal rights are assigned. Thus, contract power 
does not minimize transaction costs, nor does it maximize net 
surplus of cooperation or redistribute value. 
The Brazilian orange juice sector illustrates power 
in contracts. During 1990s, citrus growers accused juice 
processors of concerted action, using contract terms in order 
to deliberately raise profits. Transactions of oranges between 
citrus growers and juice processing firms were performed using 
standard contracts for the whole sector from 1986 to 1995. 
The Administrative Council of Economic Defense (CADE), 
the Brazilian antitrust office, accepted those accusations, 
showing the evidence of power exertion on these contracts. 
More recently, between 2011 and 2014, the creation of a 
Council for Orange Producers and Orange Juice Industries 
(Consecitrus) was negotiated between citrus growers and juice 
processors. The economic power of juice processors influenced 
Consecitrus’ negotiation process, because the definition of 
a price formation mechanisms was debated. The CADE is 
playing a key role in Consecitrus’ creation, because it arbitrates 
negotiations between citrus growers and juice processing firms.
This paper is organized in five sections including 
this introduction. The second section presents theoretical 
background based on economic analysis of property rights 
(Barzel, 1997) as well as a theoretical model of contract power. 
Third section presents data and methods. Section four presents 
evidence of contract power in the orange juice sector at two 
different times: between 1986 and 1995; and between 2011 and 
2014. Finally, in section five, concluding remarks are made.
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND MODEL
The analysis of an institutional structure of production 
rests on the classical work of Ronald H. Coase (1937), which 
reveals the nature of the firm as a more efficient arrangement 
that saves costs by using price mechanisms, called transaction 
costs. Moreover, in a world of positive transaction costs, the 
structure of property rights influences the final allocation of 
resources (Coase, 1960) and externalities come into existence in 
the market, as firms cannot internalize all market transactions. 
Thus, in a world of positive transaction costs, institutions 
− formal and informal rules that limit human interactions 
(North, 1990) − shape governance structures (Williamson, 
1991, 1985). This institutional structure of production (Coase, 
1992), therefore, is directly related to how property rights are 
allocated (Zylbersztajn, 2010).
Barzel (1997) presents the two main definitions of property 
rights: one is the ability of an agent to use the property; and the 
other is the right that the State grants to a person. When faced 
with these two definitions, Barzel (1997, p. 3, italics in original) 
defines the first as economic property rights (hereinafter 
economic rights), i.e., “the individual ability, in expected 
terms, to consume the good (or the services of the asset)”. The 
second one, according to Barzel (1997, p. 4, italics in original), 
refers to legal property rights (hereinafter legal rights), which 
is defined as “the rights recognized and enforced, in part, 
by the government”. These two categories are not mutually 
exclusive types of rights”, because according to Barzel (1997: 
3) “economic rights are the end (that is, what people ultimately 
seek), whereas legal rights are the means to achieve the end”. 
Thus, economic rights are the end of all transactions, which 
can or cannot be done through legal rights (means).
In this perspective, a commodity is a bundle of attributes 
(Barzel, 1982, Barzel, 1997) and transactions are the 
transference of property rights over attributes. These attributes 
carry inherent quality variability and, given bounded rationality 
and imperfect information (Simon, 1961), there are costs to 
assess quality. It is necessary to specify attributes and evaluate 
quality in order to transfer ownership. These measurement costs 
are also called transaction costs. For Barzel (1997), transaction 
costs are therefore costs associated with the transference, 
capture and protection of property rights.
For instance, the orange (fruit) can be broken down into 
several attributes, such as acidity, color, concentration of 
soluble solids, absence of pesticides that affect health, maturity 
level at harvest, harvesting and transportation responsibility, 
among others. It is possible to assign marginal payments for 
attribute variation, i.e., it is possible to price those attributes. 
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For instance, solids content or weight, as a payment unit, can 
define prices in contracts for purchasing oranges. For solids 
content (the first case), it is necessary to measure the soluble 
solid concentration attribute, which varies from fruit to fruit. 
Technical tests and accurate monitoring of measurement 
procedures are required to coordinate this transaction. In 
the second case, boxes of 40.8 kg (weight) define prices in 
contracts. The measurement is simpler and easier to monitor, 
and evaluating the weight is more direct than evaluating solids 
content. 
More complex measurement mechanisms frequently unveil 
more attributes, but also raise measurement cost; this logic will 
be important in the following pages. It is evident that transaction 
costs can arise from different contract terms, and the choice of 
these contractual terms are based on tradeoffs between costs 
and benefits of performing the measurement.
Recognizing the commodity as a bundle of attributes, 
and teking into account attributes quality variability, figure 
1 represents the transaction, adapted from Zylbersztajn 
(2006). The commodity is separated into n attributes, and 
it is possible to find different types of safeguards for each 
attribute, depending on the costs of measurement. Thus, in 
the same commodity, more than one safeguard mechanism 
guarantees property rights. Note that attributes guaranteed 
by formal institutions, the judiciary and hierarchies have 
legal rights assigned to them, while private mechanisms have 
assigned economic rights. There are also attributes whose 
costs are prohibitively high, since benefits are less than the 
costs of measuring. Attributes with prohibitive measurement 
costs – where costs are greater than benefits – are allocated in 
the public domain, and subsequently value dissipation occurs.
Property rights are guaranteed in different ways, just like 
the governance mechanisms proposed by Williamson (1991). 
Guarantees are chosen in order to minimize measurement costs. 
For the case of low measurement costs, i.e., low variability, it 
is not necessary to establish contracts or vertical integration, 
because courts are able to assure property rights; this is a typical 
market transaction. As measurement costs increase, difficulties 
in adjudication arise within courts and new guarantees emerge 
through private mechanisms, contracts or vertical integration. 
When measurement costs become higher, more types of 
organization can be found. On the one hand, contracts are one 
of these types and they depend on courts, because contract terms 
are the reference for adjudication. However, on the other hand, 
there are private mechanisms with no court intervention or 
hierarchical coordination, such as economic sanctions imposed 
by one party; for example, sanctions imposed by retailers on 
suppliers, described by Arruñada (2000), or diamond sales per 
sights imposed by De Beers (Kenney and Klein, 1983). Finally, 
vertical integration is hierarchical coordination executed within 
an organization.
As the definition of property rights depends on measuring 
a commodity’s attributes, each attribute must be allocated into 
three different dimensions: legal rights, economic rights and the 
public domain (Barzel, 1997). Zylbersztajn (2010) proposes an 
index to analyze property rights definition, called the Property 
Guarantee by courts
Guarantee by hierarchy
Guarantee by private mechanisms
No guarantee (public domain)
Figure 1: Property Rights Structure and Types of Guarantees 
Source: adapted from Zylbersztajn (2006).
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Rights Index (PRi) (Zylbersztajn, 2010). Allocation of property 
rights depends on transaction costs, and the index ranges from 
0 to 1 between two poles: (1) the first pole is the absence of 
transaction costs and the attribute is fully guaranteed by legal 
right; and (2) in the opposite pole, transaction costs are at 
maximum and property rights are in the public domain. Figure 
2 represents PRi and, in the real world, a commodity frequently 
presents attributes guaranteed by all property right dimensions.
In effect, a transaction cannot be seen as a simple 
transference of property rights, but as a relationship that builds 
a framework for property rights allocation. The property rights 
structure is granted by different means, and the contract is only 
one of these means. This paper focuses on the contract, because 
it defines which attributes are relevant in the transaction and 
how the parties distribute economic rents derived from each 
attribute. Contract terms are essential to understand property 
rights structure.
However, the process of contract terms selection has 
received little attention in literature, because economist 
frequently assume that terms are competitively chosen in 
order to maximize value creation. Barzel (1997, p.40) states 
the following: “I assume that contract terms are determined by 
competition and, therefore, that those contracts that maximize 
the value of each transaction means the net of all the associated 
costs will prevail”. Allen and Lueck (2002: 5) also made the 
same kind of statement: “we assume that all parties [...] choose 
contracts and organizational forms because they maximize the 
expected value of the relationship”. Thus, a theoretical model 
that explores the underlying process of contract terms selection 
in the presence of positive transaction costs is needed in order 
to understand two mechanisms in this process: competition and 
power (the latter being the situation when there is insufficient 
competition).
2.1. The theoretical model
The model analyzes contract terms selection in the presence 
of positive measurement costs as well as contractual failures. 
More specifically, with contracts being central, the model 
analyzes the delimitation of legal rights. As stated by Barzel 
(1997), economic rights are the ends, i.e., the economic 
benefits of consuming services. Legal rights are the means of 
guaranteeing the consumption of these attributes. Specifying 
a contractual provision, one party who has economic rights 
assigned by legal rights over an attribute will be able to 
appropriate economic rents from this attribute. Thus, in general, 
the model has the limitation of targeting only legal rights but, 
specifically, it fulfills the purpose of serving as an analytical 
tool for contracts. 
Initially, we analyze a situation where contract terms 
are competitively chosen to ensure economic rights through 
legal rights (contract) and, then, we analyze the situation 
where competition is insufficient and contract power imposes 
additional costs in order to change the final allocation of 
property rights. The construction of a contract involves 
costs and benefits of including or excluding contract terms. 
Therefore, our first task is to understand these costs and benefits, 
as well as how competition among contract terms can indicate 
those that will be selected by economic agents.
First, assume that commodity attributes carry not only an 
internal variability, but also differ in their nature in terms of 
transparency and complicacy. In other words, some attributes 
have direct measurement, while others attributes have 
indirect measurement (Sykuta & Parcell, 2003). Thus, when 
a commodity is taken, we can assume that some attributes 
are initially easy to measure, because there are attributes of 
direct measurement. After exhausting attributes of simple 
measurement, additional measurements become more difficult, 
because they require more complex techniques, given indirect 
measurement attributes. Thus, we assume that it is possible 
to sort attributes by complicacy of measurement, from easy 
(direct) to difficult (indirect) measurement. Economic agents 
initially decide to include in contracts those attributes with 
direct (easy) measures and, then, they start to gradually include 
those attributes with indirect (difficult) measures.
In this sense, as more attributes are measured, measurement 
procedures become more complex, with indirect measurement 
attributes depending on more refined techniques and 
monitoring systems. We can assume, therefore, that as the 
level of complexity of measurement increases, more attributes 
Figure 2: Property Rights Index
Source: adapted from Zylbersztajn (2010)
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are specified and included in the contract, which becomes 
more expensive due to measurement costs. Under perfect 
competition, no measurement costs are needed and all attributes 
and prices are defined in legal rights. Conditions for perfect 
competition, however, are not found in the real world and 
contractual incompleteness arises from the impossibility of 
“presentiation”(1) (Macneil, 1978, Williamson, 1979). Thus, 
it is assumed that the contract is intended to specify most of 
the commodity attributes, i.e., the contract is as complete as 
possible.
Another assumption states that as more attributes are 
revealed, higher economic benefits can be obtained, because 
more economic rights over the attributes are delimited and the 
contract becomes more complete. However, when the number 
of disclosed attributes is too large, the marginal benefit of 
revealing one more attribute is minor compared to the marginal 
benefit achieved when two attributes are revealed instead of 
just one. In other words, the economic benefits depend on the 
attributes revealed in the contract, but the marginal benefit of 
revealing attributes decreases. Given A as a level of complexity 
in a measurement system and benefits being represented by B, 
wherein B(A) and B’(A) < 0.
Regarding measurement costs, as the complexity of a 
measurement system becomes greater, evaluating an additional 
attribute is even more difficult compared to evaluating the next 
attribute of the commodity. Thus, the measurement system 
becomes more expensive. In other words, when complexity is 
low, the cost of measuring an additional attribute is relatively 
small, compared to the situation in which complexity is high 
and the measurement cost of an additional attribute is relatively 
high as well. Thus, we assume that measurement costs, given 
by M, behave differently, because marginal measuring costs 
are increasing, M(A) and M’(A) > 0.
A choice of contractual terms that maximizes surplus 
generated by cooperation, therefore, occurs when the marginal 
benefit of measurement is equal to the marginal cost of 
measurement, B’(A) = M’(A). In a situation where contract 
terms are selected competitively and transaction costs are 
positive, parties will negotiate until the maximization is 
obtained, represented by Figure 3, where Ac is the level of 
complexity of the measurement system (quantity of attributes 
revealed or included in the contract) and Gc is the governance 
cost of the contract. Level Gc is the minimum measurement 
cost obtained by using contracts. Ac, in turn, represents the level 
of contractual incompleteness, because it determines which 
attributes are viable to measure and which have prohibitive 
measurement costs.
Analyzing Figure 3, we observe that attributes on the 
left of Ac contain attributes specified in the contract. These 
attributes have quality standards, measurement methods, 
and monitoring procedures. Attributes on the right of Ac are 
attribute that remain unspecified in the contract. This model 
explains the formation of legal rights, which are the attributes 
Figure 3: Competitive Contract Choice
Figure 4: Contract Power
on the left of Ac. This feature of the model does not mean that 
unspecified (to the right of Ac) attributes were placed into the 
public domain. Unspecified attributes can be consumed through 
economic rights, but contracts do not define marginal payment 
for those attributes. Barzel (1997: 40) emphasizes in this idea 
that unspecified attributes can be consumed despite no legal 
rights being assigned: “among the unspecified attributes, some 
are subject to control by the buyer and some by the seller. By 
‘control’ I mean one’s freedom to manipulate the particular 
unspecified attribute without making any marginal payment 
to others”.
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Once the reference of competitive contract choice is 
established, it is possible to analyze the effects of power on this 
process. Contract power, as defined in this paper, is the ability 
to impose costs. This imposition strategically leaves gaps in 
contracts in order to influence property rights allocation. In 
other words, contract power is the exploitation of contractual 
gaps, or the failure of contractual provisions, which are 
strategically left incomplete. Thus, contract power is treated in 
the model as the parameter δ, which shifts the measurement cost 
curve – imposing additional costs. Measurement costs are now 
given by M(A, δ), and when δ > 0 contract power takes place. 
Figure 4 shows the effect of economic power over contractual 
terms selection, where the distance between Mc and Mp curve 
is given by the parameter δ. Mc is the marginal measurement 
cost under competition and Mp is the marginal measurement 
cost under contract power.
Values Ap and Gp are, respectively, the complexity level 
of the measurement system and governance costs of the 
contract in the presence of contract power. Parameter δ shifts 
the marginal measurement cost curve up and, therefore, 
increased the total measurement cost, represented by c (= 
Gp – Gc). Thus, when contract power takes place, there is no 
measurement cost minimization, which decreases the total net 
surplus of cooperation. This occurs by imposing terms that 
hurdle measurement procedures and it increases renegotiations, 
conflicts and disputes that are hard to adjudicate by courts or 
to arbitrate through specialized organizations.
Contract power also fails to allocate property rights of 
a subset of attributes, represented by e (= Ac – Ap). Thus, 
contract power increases contractual incompleteness, because 
no contract terms are set to specify those e attributes, which 
are allocated in the economic rights of one party or both 
parties. Unspecified e attributes have no assigned legal 
rights and consumption occurs with no marginal payment. 
Notwithstanding, e attributes remain unspecified not because 
of high measurement costs, but because of the choice of one 
party to impose additional costs. Contract power changes the 
structure of property rights and the result is low-net value 
from cooperation and large benefits to one party that consumes 
attributes without marginal payments.
Attributes that would be allocated in legal rights under a 
competitive selection process are, in fact, allocated in economic 
rights for those who have contract power. In figure 4, there is no 
analytical insight into which economic agent (buyer or seller) has 
contract power or is the beneficiary of contract power. Of course, 
the party who has the power to influence the measurement costs 
should be the party who controls the attributes left unspecified, 
otherwise there is no economic incentive to exercise power. 
Identification of the party with contract power must be made 
case by case. In the citrus industry located in São Paulo, contract 
power is exercised by juice processing firms – the buyer.
3. DATA AND METHODS
This is a case study that uses qualitative techniques to 
analyze the content of written documents from the Brazilian 
antitrust office, the CADE. Although the main feature of 
case study is the direct observation of phenomena, this study 
focuses on events in the past. Thus, taking into account 
historical context is critical to the analysis, since “institutions 
are historically specific, and for this reason it is necessary to be 
sensitive to historical context” (Alston, 1996: 25). Thus, those 
events and factors that influenced contracts during standard 
contracts, from 1986 to 1995, and during the negotiation of 
Consecitrus, 2011-2014, are emphasized.
This qualitative research assessed a wide range of different 
data sources, such as reports, interviews, field visits and, in 
particular, documents of the Brazilian antitrust office. Evidence 
Table 1
Analyzed Documents
References Description
SDE (1994) Preliminary Investigation, December 27
th, 1994, Administrative Process nr 08000-012720/94-74, Economic 
Defense Secretariat
SDE (1995) Final Report, July 12th, 1995, Administrative Process nr 08000-012720/94-74, Economic Defense Secretariat
CADE (1995a) Specialist Opinion nr 23/95, September 20
th, 1995, Administrative Process nr 08000.012720/94-74, Administrative 
Council of Economic Defense
CADE (1995b) Vote, Counselor Neide Teresinha Malard, Administrative Process nr 08000.012720/94-74, Administrative Council of Economic Defense
CADE (1995c) Term of Conduct Cessation, October 31th, 1995, Administrative Council of Economic Defense
Maia (1996) Standard Contract Copy, crop season 1990/91
None Contract of Coinbra-Frutesp (a juice processing firm),  crop season 1994/95
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of contract power was extracted from content analysis of 
several documents listed in table 1. Other data sources were 
secondary in this paper, since they only offered an overview 
of the historical context of the case.
The selected documents were systematically interpreted 
using content analysis. Content analysis is a technique to extract 
meaning from messages or communication (Bardin, 1995). 
In general, four categories were defined: (1) contract terms; 
(2) power; (3) commodity attributes; and (4) The CADE’s 
opinion. Categories were designed according to the theoretical 
background and the theoretical model of contract power. During 
the analysis, some propositions are made about contract power 
and, then, the content of documents are used to support these 
propositions (Vergara, 2009). In some cases, data on prices, 
production, industrial yields, among others are also used to 
support our propositions.
4. CONTRACT POWER IN ORANGE JUICE  
 SECTOR: EVIDENCE
The Citrus industry in São Paulo state is dedicated to 
the production and exportation of high quality orange juice. 
The genesis of the orange juice sector in Brazil is related to 
weather conditions in Florida and an excess of oranges being 
controlled by large groups of fruit exporters. After an intense 
frost in Florida in the crop season of 1962/1963, the first orange 
juice processor plant was installed in São Paulo state in 1963. 
Initially complementary, juice production in Brazil presented 
fast growth during the 1970s and 1980s. Exportation of orange 
juice increased from 531 tons in 1963 to more than 33 thousand 
tons in 1970 and, then, to more than 401 thousand tons in 1980. 
The sector became more specialized over time, with 2% of 
orange production in São Paulo being used to produce juice in 
1970, which changed to 81% in 1980. 
Until the 1970s, transactions between citrus growers and 
juice processors were a typical market transaction (Azevedo, 
1996, Hasse, 1987). Nevertheless, specific investments 
deepened over time as the sector expansion, with 81% of all 
oranges being used to produce juice by 1980. Another important 
factor is the technological features of production processes. As 
juice production is a large operation and requires economies of 
scale, citrus growers could easily face diseconomies of scale. 
The industrial structure of juice processors is naturally more 
concentrated than agricultural production. In this context, 
the presence of specific investments and power asymmetries 
derived from industrial structures led to the creation of citrus 
growers association in the beginning of the 1970s, called 
Associação Paulista de Citricultores (Associtrus). At the same 
time, juice processors followed growers’ initiatives, creating 
their association named Associação Brasileira das Indústrias 
de Sucos Cítricos (Abrassucos).
Market transactions faced increasing governance costs. In 
response to these characteristics, collective negotiations started 
between the associations, Associtrus and Abrassucos, in order to 
deal with several conflicts among the parties. These collective 
negotiations led to the creation of Citrus Committees at a federal 
and state government level at the beginning of the 1970s. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the presence of the government 
in economic activity was frequent in agro-industrial relations; 
for instance, sugarcane, coffee and milk were regulated sectors 
in the Brazilian economy. 
The Citrus Committee worked well as a coordination 
mechanism until the beginning of the 1980s.  Nevertheless, 
frosts in Florida increased juice prices and Brazilian juice 
processors could achieve higher profits. Citrus growers, 
however, were not able to take any advantage of international 
market’s conditions. The Citrus Committee failed to provide 
agreement on this new market condition and, in the 1986/87 
crop season, a standard contract was created as a private 
solution, excluding government participation. Creation of 
the standard contract was intermediated by Abrassucos and 
Associtrus. The new contract design linked juice prices in 
the New York Board of Trade (NYBOT) to orange prices 
in the Brazilian domestic market, though its adoption was 
voluntary. Citrus growers widely adopted this contract and its 
initial results were beneficial. Beyond the change in prices, 
the Brazilian institutional environment was in transformation 
due to the end of the military government in the 1980s and 
economic openness and stabilization in the 1990s. Government 
regulation in economic activity decreased in the 1990s and 
private solutions to transactions emerged as the government 
withdrew. These events occurred in several agricultural sectors 
and standard contracts were the solution adopted by the citrus 
sector at that time. 
Beneficial results from the adoption of standard contracts 
were, however, only transitory for citrus growers. Juice prices 
in the NYBOT were an important determinant of orange prices 
in Brazil and these prices became highly volatile. When citrus 
growers accepted standard contracts, they were both accepting 
benefits from increases in juice prices and accepting risk from 
decreases in those prices. Then, at the beginning of 1990s, citrus 
growers faced deficits as orange prices fell below production 
costs. Citrus growers were also dissatisfied with some terms 
of the standard contracts, which were not modified in private 
negotiations. First, citrus growers claimed that juice processors 
were deliberately delaying orange harvest, causing dehydration 
of the fruit that lowers weight and prices. Second, citrus growers 
requested a change of payment method from weight (box of 
40,8 kg) to solids content, since the amount of juice inside the 
orange correlates with its solids content rather than its weight. 
There was no agreement on these topics.
Disagreements about standard contracts motivated 
Associtrus and other representative associations to initiate a 
litigation process in the Administrative Council of Economic 
Defense (CADE), the Brazilian antitrust office. Citrus growers 
accused juice processors of concerted action, using contract 
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terms in order to deliberately raise profits. The CADE accepted 
the accusations and initiated the legal process, but citrus 
growers and juice processors achieved an agreement, called 
the “commitment term” in order to conduct cessation. In this 
agreement, the CADE suspended the use of standard contracts 
and collective negotiation of juice processors was forbidden. In 
practice, the CADE extinguished the standard contract and the 
sector started to pursuit new forms of organization.
4.1. Contract power in standard contracts
The standard contract was at the center of citrus growers’ 
accusations against juice processing firm. It is worth noting 
that some of the contract terms were a critical component in 
the contractual relationship between citrus growers and juice 
processor industries:
the use of the standard contract imposed by the 
processing industry on producers [citrus growers] 
is a clear offense against the law, since the “oranges 
came to be purchased within the terms imposed by a 
cartel of buyers, formed by concerted actions of all 
orange juice processors that were submitted to all 
the productive sector (SDE, 1994, p 1647)
The main feature of the standard contract is the formula for 
calculating the orange box price:
OBP = (Orange Juice Price NYBOT) –  
(Total Expenditures + Return on Capital)
___________________________________________
Average Industrial Yield of Fruits
Where, OBP is the orange box(2). 
At the center of some of the allegations made by the growers 
is the unit of payment. The price unit is a box of 40.8 kg − the 
fruit weight. Citrus growers suggested a change from weight to 
soluble solids, or solids content (Brix). Orange juice produced 
in Brazil and exported to Europe and the United States has a 
high level of homogeneity in terms of concentration of solids 
(degrees Brix). Thus, juice processors are concerned about 
solids content within oranges at the moment of purchase, 
because solids content are responsible for the industrial yield 
(productivity) of the fruit instead of its weight. Then, when juice 
processors purchase oranges, they are actually buying solids 
within the fruit instead of a quantity of liquid. Because of this, 
juice processors could avoid the change in payment method.
4.1.1. Avoidance of the change in the payment method
The lack of soluble solids-content measures in standard 
contracts was at the center of citrus growers’ accusations in 
this litigation:
- The quality of commercial oranges is measured 
by the amount of “soluble solids” that it presents, 
and “the greater the presence of soluble solids in 
the fruit, the higher its yield of juice, and not, as 
might be supposed, by the presence of liquid in 
the oranges”; 
- Although this scientific truth should remove the 
weight of the fruit for defining the purchase price 
of the product, juice processor firms, impose such 
criteria to producers, which, according to represen-
tatives [citrus growers], constitute violations of the 
economic order (SDE , 1994: 1644-1645, translated 
from Portuguese).
According to the aforementioned transcription, citrus 
growers pointed out that juice processors avoid the adoption of 
the solids content to calculate orange prices. The adoption of 
solids content as a price unit is not a novelty; the orange juice 
industry in Florida, USA, uses this price standard (Fernandes, 
2003), and juice prices in the NYBOT are defined in dollars 
per solids weight (which is the solids content). Similarly, in 
Brazil, the sugarcane sector employs a payment system based 
on sugar content in sugarcane (the same principle as solids 
content), named total recoverable sugars. In fact, sugarcane 
is an important benchmark when discussing organizational 
changes in the orange juice sector (Belik, Paulillo and Vian, 
2012). Alternative contract types are available, but price unit 
remains unchanged.
Adoption of the formula for calculating orange box prices 
in standard contracts brings, indirectly, the variability of solids 
content to price formation. The denominator in the formula is 
the average industrial yield of the fruit, given by the number of 
orange boxes needed to produce 1 ton of juice. More productive 
fruits generate lower rates of industrial yields and higher 
orange prices, and vice-versa. It is assumed, therefore, that the 
standard contract has improved the accuracy of solid contents 
evaluation, if compared to the previous contracts (proposition 
1), i.e., before 1986. 
Nevertheless, juice processors avoided the US measurement 
system (dollars per weight of solids). Therefore, it is assumed 
that the US measurement system was more accurate than 
the Brazilian measurement system in standard contracts 
(proposition 2). Propositions 1 and 2 are in fact based on 
the logic that the adoption of standard contracts improves the 
evaluation (measurement) of solids content of oranges − as 
citrus growers requested at the time, but a more most accurate 
measurement system like the US’s was not chosen. In other 
words, the capacity to impose the formula in standard contracts 
and the avoidance of price unit using solids content is the 
ability to impose measurement costs. This is the manifestation 
of juice processors’ contract power, because solids content 
remains partially unspecified and juice processors can consume 
it without marginal payment.
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In order to confirm the propositions, we collected data 
of orange box prices in the USA (Source: USDA) and 
Brazil (source: Maia 1996 and IEA(3)). In addition, data was 
collected on orange juice prices in the New York Board of 
Trade (NYBOT) (source: Trombin and Neves, 2011) and 
the orange juice prices free on board at the port of Santos 
(FOB Santos) (source: Ministry of Development, Industry 
and Foreign Trade, Brazil). Thus, the correlation between 
orange prices and juice prices were computed. Table 2 shows 
the correlation results.
Results in table 2 support propositions 1 and 2, since 
correlations between orange price and juice prices during 
standard contracts are higher than the previous period. 
Correlations between orange prices and juice prices are higher 
in US than Brazil, which means that the US measurement 
system is more accurate than the Brazilian one. These results 
suggest that avoidance of solids content as a price unit 
enables juice processors to internalize quality variability of 
oranges. Furthermore, avoidance of solids content as a price 
unit has two additional implications: (1) overestimation of 
the average industrial yield used to calculate the price of an 
orange box; and (2) deliberate delay of harvest executed by 
juice processors. The following subsections explain these 
implications.
4.1.2. Overestimation of fruit industrial yield
Orange prices in standard contracts were calculated by a 
formula with three main components: juice prices at NYBOT; 
expenditures and return on capital; and industrial yield. Citrus 
growers could estimate juice prices, expenditures and return 
on capital with greater transparency, but the industrial yield is 
more difficult to assess, even by courts. The industrial yield is 
defined by the quantity of oranges needed to produce 1 ton of 
orange juice. The industrial yield varies across crop seasons 
and regions. However, this productivity rate is an important 
factor in price formation for orange boxes during the standard 
contract period. As the denominator of the formula, the rate 
serves as a weight for the other values in the numerator. The 
rate of industrial yield depends on the average past industrial 
yield, which is informed by juice processors. Given information 
asymmetry, juice processors can overestimate the rate in order 
to obtain lower orange prices. In fact, citrus growers included 
the manipulation of productivity rates in their accusations at 
the CADE: 
- Beyond the benefits of weight criterion, another 
contractual condition is imposed by the acquiring 
industry, namely, the “rate of industrial yield of the 
fruit”. Such criterion would be entirely arbitrary, 
because “it is impossible that all the juice proces-
sing firms have the same level of productivity; i.e., 
firstly they all equally require 280 boxes to produce 
the same amount of juice, and when they decided to 
reduce this index as they did, they all require 260 
boxes, as we have now”; 
- The relationship between producer [citrus grower] 
and industry [juice processor] results in a paradox, 
because, according to the representatives [citrus gro-
wers], the better the fruit, the higher the productivity, 
the lower the gain, since there is no link between 
investments and remuneration, as the industry puts 
all citrus growers under equal conditions (SDE, 
1994: 1644-1645, translated from Portuguese). 
Moreover, citrus growers’ associations made successful 
efforts to modify these rates, mitigating the problem, as 
described by Maia (1996, p 92.): 
[Citrus growers’] representative associations have 
intensified their efforts to improve the contract 
and, thus, in 1988/89, several terms were modified 
in favor of growers, namely: the rate of the fruit’s 
industrial yield, expressed in boxes of 40.8 kg per 
ton of juice, changed from 280 to 272, because, 
according to the associations, the weighted average 
Table 2
Correlation Between Orange Prices and Juice Prices, Periods 1971/72 and 1994/95
Period País Correlation between... Index (r)
Before Standard Contract 
(1971/72 - 1985/86)
USA Orange x NYBOT 0,99
Brazil Orange x NYBOT 0,48
Brazil Orange x FOB Santos 0,75
Standard Contract 
(1986/87 - 1994/95)
USA Orange x NYBOT 0,92
Brazil Orange x NYBOT 0,71
Brazil Orange x FOB Santos 0,51
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yields of five crops processed by Frutesp, calculated 
from reports published by the company had been 
approximately 252 boxes per ton of juice [...] 
The growers, however, were still questioning the rate 
of industrial yield and, then, in 1989/90 and 1990/91, 
it was set at 270 boxes and, finally, in 1991/92, 260 
boxes per ton of juice was established. 
Frutesp, a juice processor firm controlled by a cooperative of 
citrus growers, played an important role in reducing information 
asymmetry when negotiating rates of industrial yield (Maia, 
1996; Azevedo, 1996). Nevertheless, rates in contracts were 
still above 252 boxes, which was the industrial yield of Frutesp 
at time. Thus, information from Frutesp was not sufficient to 
eliminate contract power. Defining a formula with a component 
that is difficult to assess, juice-processing firms could impose 
higher rates for industrial yields, increasing orange prices 
and consuming higher amounts of solids content without any 
marginal payment. It is assumed that rates of industrial yield 
are overestimated in standard contracts, underpricing the orange 
to the benefit of juice processors (proposition 3).
Using data about the quantity of orange juice production and 
quantity of orange processed (source: CitrusBR), we estimated 
the industrial yield actually achieved between 1988/89 and 
1990/91 (real industrial yield). From the standard contract 
formula, we calculated the orange price using the rate of 
industrial yield defined in contracts at the time and the rate of 
industrial yield actually achieved. Table 3 presents the results. 
There is no data available about prices in standard contracts for 
1986/87, 1987/88, and between 1990/91 and 1993/94. 
Results in table 3 support proposition 3 as orange prices 
between 1988/89 and 1990/91 using rates of industrial yield in 
contracts were lower than prices calculated using the industrial 
yield actually achieved. The amount of redistribution in favor 
of the juice processor is U$ 28.7 million, US$ 38.18 million, 
and U$ 25.93 million, respectively, for the crop seasons of 
1988/89, 1989/90, and 1990/91. 
In the standard contract period, taking into account the 
period between 1988/89 and 1994/95, the lowest industrial yield 
is 233.3 in 1994/95, while the higher industrial yield is 260.7 
in 1988/89. The average industrial yield rate for the available 
data is 246.5 and the standard deviation is 11.9. These numbers 
mean that considering optimist and pessimist scenarios, juice 
processors could estimate a range of industrial yields from 
234.6 to 258.5. It is worth noting that the highest rate in the 
pessimist scenario is 258.5, which is close to the 260 defined 
in the contract between 1991/92 and 1993/94. Proposition 3 is 
also supported by this data. 
4.1.3. Deliberate delay of harvest
Finally, one can explore another way to allocate economic 
rights on the variability of solids content within oranges that 
is not specified in contracts. This action is related to the time 
of harvesting, as shown by the transcription of citrus growers’ 
complaint:
- Juice processors slowed, intentionally and in a 
concerted manner, the pace of harvest, to benefit 
from the highest yield of the late-harvested oranges 
and lower the cost of obtaining it, which would result 
in increased profits, according to representatives 
[citrus growers]; 
- The purpose of delaying the harvest is to obtain 
an even more dehydrated fruit, which, therefore, 
contains higher concentrations of soluble solids, the 
raw material of juice. Furthermore, maintaining a 
fixed weight per orange box would mean that smaller 
Table 3
Influence of Contract Power Over Industrial Yield Rate
Crop 
Season
Industrial Yield In 
Standard Contract
Price In Standard 
Contract (US$)
Real Industrial 
Yield 
Simulated Price Using 
Real Industrial Yield (US$)
Under-Pricing 
(US$)
1986/87 280 - - - -
1987/88 280 - - - -
1988/89 272 3.73 261 3.89 0,16
1989/90 270 3.54 259 3.69 0,15
1990/91 270 1.11 242 1.24 0,13
1991/92 260 - 236 - -
1992/93 260 - 257 - -
1993/94 260 - 237 - -
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and lighter fruits would be necessary to complete 
one box. Because of this, juice processors obtain 
a greater number of units of orange fruits from the 
same quantity of orange boxes and, consequently, 
a larger amount of juice. 
- Considering that citrus growers receive money ba-
sed on the quantity of fruit instead of by its produc-
tivity, delays in harvest imply less fruit to harvest, 
which means greater benefits to juice processors 
with obvious detriment to citrus growers (SDE, 
1994: 1658, translated from Portuguese).
Juice processors purchase fruit in advance, in the trees and 
before maturity, and control the exact moment of harvesting. 
In this case, it is assumed that juice processors will wait as 
long as possible to harvest fruits with maximum solids content 
and minimum weight (proposition 4). However, this action 
means losses through over-mature oranges and oranges that 
are passed the optimum harvest period suggested by technical 
requirements. It is not possible to point to empirical evidence 
for this practice and proposition 4 cannot be verified.
4.1.4. Alternative explanations offered by juice processors
The aforementioned content analysis of Brazilian antitrust 
office documents that supported our propositions are, in fact, 
part of the accusations formulated by citrus growers. This 
means that these actions were not necessarily recognized as 
anticompetitive actions by antitrust authorities. Thus, taking 
into account the content of arguments formulated by juice 
processors in their defense is a critical step, in order to look 
for alternative and efficiency driven explanations.
The arguments presented by juice processors can be 
summarized as follow: (1) there are other contractual options 
available such as selling the fruits for fresh consumption; (2) 
there are uniform conducts in contracts of juice processors due 
to technological features of the juice production process;  (3) 
the economic problems from standard contracts are, in fact, the 
consequence of the low price level of juice in the international 
market; and (4) this contractual problem is a private and 
commercial matter between the parties and, therefore, outside 
the authority of the CADE. Antitrust authorities considered 
the arguments presented by juice processors to be fragile, and 
also indicated that juice processors were trying to delay the 
decision, as the transcription shows:
None of the indicted [juice processors] deny the 
use of standard contracts or their anticompetitive 
content. On the contrary, they justify both the use 
and effects of standard contracts as a matter of a 
commercial nature.
[...] in front of the impossibility of defense from the 
acts that constitute anticompetitive practices, the 
only answer of the juice processors is to defer the 
course of the litigation, in order to insure delays and 
try to make the antitrust office’s analysis unfeasible 
(SDE, 1995: 5544, translated from portuguess).
 Brazilian antitrust authorities did not present a 
conclusion about which terms in the standard contracts had 
anticompetitive effects. However, they did not recognize any 
efficiency driven effects from standard contracts when juice 
processors’ arguments were presented. As arguments from 
accusations are the main evidence supporting contract power 
propositions, prudence is necessary in conclusions − even if 
alternative explanations are fragile.
4.2. Contract power during consecitrus’ negotiations
The end of standard contracts had an immediate and 
positive effect for citrus growers, since they acquired better 
price levels for oranges. Nevertheless, the CADE intervention 
had transitory effects (Marino and Azevedo, 2003), partly 
because power asymmetries between citrus growers and 
juice processor were reestablished by the prohibition of the 
collectively negotiated contract. The sector found new forms 
of organization for orange transactions and backward partial 
vertical integration of juice processors increased during the 
1990s and 2000s. 
In 2011, two large juice processors started a merger and 
acquisition (M&A) process, which was regulated by antitrust 
authorities. As industrial concentrations became even higher, 
the CADE decided to impose a condition to the approval of the 
M&A, which was the creation of a transparent price formation 
system for oranges. The CADE decided that it was imperative 
to mitigate the effects of economic power of juice processors 
through this price formation mechanism. In order to build 
this price mechanism, citrus growers and juice processors 
underwent negotiations for the creation of the Council of 
Orange Producers and Orange Juice Industries, or Consecitrus. 
This negotiation existed since 2000, but had been paralyzed. 
When negotiations restarted, juice processors moved quickly 
to create a model by which orange prices could be calculated. 
We assume that juice processors would take advantage of their 
economic power to propose a price formation mechanism with 
difficult to adjudicate features, raising measurement costs, 
etc. in order to consume attributes without marginal payments 
(proposition 5).
Consecitrus’ model was effectively launched in October 
2012, a few months after the signing of its statute (Consecitrus, 
2012a). Citrus growers had no participation in the creation 
of Consecitrus or the construction of the Consecitrus model 
(Consecitrus, 2012b). Actually, citrus growers’ associations 
did not agree with several topics of the model since it used 
inaccurate technical criteria of the production process, as shown 
in the following transcript: 
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Associtrus and FAESP on November 6th, 2012 − 
manifested by the reformulation of the parameters 
for prices calculated by the model − claim that the 
study is incomplete and contains errors. These are: 
(i) stating that Brazilian agricultural production 
is not high-tech and does have high levels of effi-
ciency; (ii) overestimating average production in the 
agricultural sector and underestimating it in juice 
processing; (iii) underestimating the costs of agri-
cultural production and disregarding investments 
in facilities and land; (iv) underestimating historic 
orange prices; and (v) biases with  technological 
coefficients and input prices; favoring industry 
[juices processors] and reducing the participation 
of growers in economies of scale (CADE, 2014: 
66-67, translated from Portuguese).
Dissatisfaction of citrus growers can be illustrated by two 
examples. The basic rural unit used to determine the rates 
was from a farm with the capacity to produce 20 million 
boxes of oranges per season. This is not the size of a typical 
citrus-growing farm, which puts in doubt the technological 
assumptions and economies of scale presented by the model. 
Moreover, the criterion for profit sharing between processors 
and growers was calculated by the capital invested by each 
party. However, land value was not included as part of the 
capital invested of citrus growers. Proposition 5 is supported, 
because juice processors tried to take advantage of the 
formation of a new contract design, proposing a model to their 
own benefit. 
The CADE did not accept the proposed model and, in 
December 2012, antitrust authorities suspended Consecitrus’ 
activities. The expected voluntary and negotiated agreement 
between citrus growers and juice processors was not achieved 
and the CADE decided to interfere directly in the process. 
In 2013, the CADE played an active role in the formation of 
Consecitrus, but the antitrust agency did not impose a contract 
design. The solution was to propose and enforce a governance 
structure for Consecitrus. The aim of this governance structure 
was to equalize voting between citrus growers and juice 
processors and, then, these parties can figure out their new 
contract design or their new contracts designs.
4.3. Antitrust remedies to contract power
Although antitrust litigations in the orange juice sector 
occurred in two distinct periods and are different in nature, 
the core of the problem in both cases was economic power in 
contract terms selection. The failure of a competitive process 
to choose contract terms, nevertheless, was approached 
through different methods. It is fruitful to analyze two 
different means by which the CADE intervened in the orange 
juice sector.
First of all, in 1994/95, the CADE decided to end standard 
contracts, i.e., the main instrument that coordinates transactions 
and simply prohibits contract power. However, contractual 
problems were still present, with failures in standard contracts 
being due to insufficient competition in the selection process. 
The CADE did not address any action on the central cause of 
the problem. However, the learning process in antitrust offices 
allowed for more effective action in the future, which was the 
case almost 20 years later.
Thus, from 2011 to 2013, contractual problems and 
potential contractual failures emerged in Consecitrus 
negotiations. Instead of the simple prohibition of a new type 
of contract, the CADE had a more pro-active voice in the 
negotiation process, as the antitrust office directly imposed 
itself on Consecitrus. In this case, the CADE recognized 
that power asymmetries might prevail in the relationship 
between citrus growers and juice processors. Competition was 
not an efficient means to organize contracts in the sector. If 
prohibition was not effective, the CADE must find new ways 
to deal with problems of this nature.
Counselor Ricardo Machado Ruiz, in his vote in the 
administrative litigation (CADE, 2014: 79-80), clearly stated 
this problem: 
The central purpose of Consecitrus should be the re-
duction of bargaining power between citrus growers 
(orange producers) and industries (concentrated 
juice producers) when pricing orange boxes, which 
is the main but not the only bargaining object.
[...] the structural basis of the asymmetric power 
is the high market-concentration of juice proces-
sors (oligopsony) vis-à-vis the high fragmentation 
among citrus growers (competition). Consecitrus 
should be an institution that connects these two 
segments.
Nevertheless, the CADE was not able to simply impose a 
new contract type. As an antitrust office, the CADE would not 
take the place of the competition and write a new contract for 
the sector. On the contrary, the CADE was supposed to promote 
competition in the process of selection of contract terms, which 
could induce the formation of a new contract design or even new 
contract designs. In principle, economic agents in the orange 
juice sector should be able to choose many different contract 
types, where neither juice processors nor citrus growers could 
impose terms in contracts. The challenge was to delineate as 
an antitrust remedy that could accomplish this task.
The solution applied by the Brazilian antitrust office 
was based on countervailing power (Galbraith, 1952). 
The countervailing power concept states that horizontal 
coordination on the seller side of a transaction can be efficient 
if the sellers face buyers holding high economic power 
(monopsony or oligopsony). Azevedo and Almeida (2009) 
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argue that the principle of countervailing power could be 
applied in antitrust decisions under the right conditions. This 
application is not trivial, because horizontal coordination in 
antitrust cases is typically seen as an initiative that leads to 
cartels. Thus, first, it is important to separate those situations 
in which countervailing power is efficient from those which 
promote economic power. 
In the orange juice sector, the CADE analyzed the case 
using the theoretical background developed by Azevedo and 
Almeida (2009), especially the case of a chain constituted of 
monopoly-monopsony-competition. Therefore, the CADE 
decided to apply countervailing power principles to the 
governance aspects of Consecitrus. It is important to note 
that countervailing power did not imply a change of industrial 
structure of both citrus growers and juice processors, which 
would have been very expensive. Instead, the CADE decided 
to impose constraints on the action of economic agents 
involved in Consecitrus’ administration. Furthermore, the 
CADE was responsible for the establishment of a schedule to 
implement changes in the governance rules of Consecitrus as 
well as monitor the implementation of these actions (CADE, 
2014).
The underlying rational behind the CADE’s intervention 
was to mitigate power asymmetries between citrus growers 
and juice processors through the creation of Consecitrus. The 
CADE constrained the action using the governance rules of 
the Council, especially those regarding the constitution of the 
board of the Council and how the board makes decisions (voting 
rules). In this way, the CADE induced horizontal coordination 
on the citrus growers’ side, and created an environment where 
farmers and juice processors are on more equal terms when 
negotiating a price formation mechanism for oranges. It is 
not possible to assess the success of this intervention, but 
in principle, the CADE’s solution in this case is a potential 
antitrust remedy for contract power in the working economy.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We proposed a model to explain how contract terms are 
selected when a type of economic power is present: contract 
power. The orange juice sector illustrates an analysis that 
demonstrates the effects of contract power on the economic 
organization of the sector. Empirical evidence supports the 
logic of contract power in three forms: (1) avoiding changes 
to payment methods from weight to solids content (quality) 
and imposing a formula to calculate orange prices; (2) using 
information asymmetries to manipulate the index formula 
that calculates orange prices; and (3) deliberately performing 
the late harvesting of oranges, in order to dehydrate the fruits 
and, consequently, reducing their weight and price. Although 
alternative explanations are rather fragile, prudence is necessary 
in these conclusions.
The main findings in this paper can contribute to the debate 
about the situations in which contract power takes place and 
the ways antitrust authorities can remedy them. In this paper, 
we were able to analyze two different actions of the antitrust 
authorities (including the demand for a new price formation 
mechanisms for oranges) when facing similar contractual 
problems in the orange juice sector. Contract power took 
place in both situations, but the remedy used in 1995 was 
not effective. Thus, the CADE decided to try another remedy 
through the creation of a council in the sector and applied the 
principle of countervailing power.
Problems of the first intervention in 1990s could be 
explained by a paradox in the conduct of the CADE. The 
paradox consists, on one hand, of the fact that competition was 
not sufficient to achieve an efficient contract and contract power 
prevailed. On the other hand, the CADE tried to avoid contract 
power by prohibiting the only working contract in the sector, 
expecting that more freedom in negotiations (competition) 
would create more efficient contractual types. The paradox is 
the attempt to solve contractual problems raised from the lack 
of competition through the lack of competition. The message 
from this first situation is: insufficient competition can create 
inefficient contracts and prohibition of these inefficient contract 
types is not a simple answer to solve the problem.
In the 2010s, the CADE faced problems related to a lack 
of competition in Consecitrus’ negotiation process. Contract 
power took place once again, but the solution was not to 
allow freedom in the negotiation between the parties. In this 
case, a lack of competition was substituted by constrained 
competition, which avoids the paradox created in 1990s. 
Consecitrus worked as an institution to constrain the actions of 
economic agents using the principle of countervailing power. 
The Council promoted the horizontal coordination of citrus 
growers and created a forum where the parties could negotiate 
on more equal terms. In effect, contract types that emerged 
from this forum suffer less from the effects of contract power. 
It is still too soon to draw conclusions from the results of the 
CADE’s solution.
(1) “Presentiation” is the ability to present all factors that 
affect the contractual relationship. It is some kind of 
perfect forecast.
(2) For more information about the components of this 
formula, consult Maia (1996).
(3) Institute of Agricultural Economics, state of São Paulo.N
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POWER AND SELECTION OF CONTRACT TERMS: THE CASE FROM THE BRAZILIAN ORANGE JUICE SECTOR 
Power and selection of contract terms: The case from the Brazilian orange juice sector
We propose a model to explain how contract terms are selected in the presence of a form of economic power: contract 
power. The orange juice sector is used to illustrate an analysis that demonstrates the effects of contract power on the 
economic organization of the sector. We define contract power as the ability to exploit contractual gaps or failures of 
contractual provisions, which are strategically left incomplete. Empirical evidence from content analysis of antitrust 
documents supports the logic of contract power in the orange juice sector in three forms: avoiding changes to payment 
methods from weight to solid contents (quality); using information asymmetries to manipulate indexes that calculate the 
formula of orange prices; and deliberately harvesting oranges late in order to dehydrate the fruit, which consequently 
reduces weight and price. The paper contributes to understanding the selection of contract terms and the debate about 
how antitrust offices can deal with this issue.
Keywords: contracts, power, measurement cost, agribusiness.
Poder y condiciones contractuales de selección: el caso del sector de zumo de naranja brasileño
El objetivo es proponer un modelo para explicar cómo se seleccionan los términos contractuales en presencia del 
poder: poder de contracto. La industria de zumo de naranja ilustra el análisis, con indicación de los efectos del poder 
de contrato en la organización económica del sector. Poder de contrato se define como la capacidad de explotar las 
brechas o fallas contractuales que quedan incompletas estratégicamente. La evidencia empírica de los documentos 
de defensa de la competencia de análisis de contenido compatible con la lógica del poder de contracto tres maneras: 
evitar el cambio de la forma de pago de peso por contenido de sólidos (calidad); el uso de la información asimétrica 
para manipular los índices en la fórmula de cálculo del precio de la naranja; y retrasar deliberadamente la cosecha 
de naranja consecuentemente implicando enla reducción de su peso y precio. Esta investigación contribuye a la 
comprensión de la selección de los términos del contrato y las formas de acción de las oficinas de defensa de la 
competencia en esto tema.
Palabras clave: contracto, poder, costos de medición, agronegocios.
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